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McLellan v. McLellan: 1 
Family Law—Division of Non-Family Assets
Since the M arital Property Act* came into force on Jan u ary  1, 1981, the 
interplay between it, and certain common law doctrines, is as yet unclear. 
A recent com m ent in this Jou rnal notes that:
Perhaps the best view is that the statute will prevail where there is any 
conflict between the com m on law and the statutory provisions. T h e  issue is 
com plicated by the fact that the reform  legislation in both O ntario and New  
Brunswick was enacted before the Suprem e Court in Heckrr v. Prttkiis adopted  
the principle of constructive trust as it relates to marital property. T herefore, 
a question arises as to w hether the codification o f  resulting trust in section  
15 o f  the New Brunswick Act excludes bv im plication the use of constructive  
trust in relation to property disputes between married persons in New  
Brunswick''
T he case under review here, however, suggests that o u r M.P.A. is not a 
com plete code, and that restitutionarv common law concepts are very much 
alive with respect to property  division in the marital forum .
Eileen and Jam es Mcl^ellan were m arried in 1971 and separated in 
1977. For the first th ree years, both were bank employees and presumably, 
both contributed regularly to the family income. T he husband left the bank 
in 1974 to start a shoe business which the wife helped to finance. Ih e  
business was evidently ra ther short-lived as, at trial. Logan |. pointed out 
“that the husband was neither very ambitious nor very diligent. He drank 
and used drugs; he kept pornographic material in the house. N In delin­
eating the facts of the case, the trial judge makes it crystal clear that the 
wife was the m ajor breadw inner for the greater part of the m arriage. Some 
time near the beginning o f the m arriage, the husband befriended  an elderlv 
widow, with no close family, nam ed Mrs. Steen. Over the next five years 
the McLellans helped Mrs. Steen on a dailv basis, and the relationship 
developed to the point where the McLellans and their child moved in to 
the Steen hom e around  January . 1977.
It is also clear from  the judgm ent that the wife, in addition to her lull- 
time job, did the housework, cooked the meals, and ran most ol the errands. 
I he husband, on the o ther hand, was Mrs. Steen’s com panion, and their 
drinking together was “regular and substantial.“ ’ In April of 1977 the wife 
left the Steen hom e with the child, feeling that the environm ent was not 
conducive to bringing up a youngster. Shortly afterw ards, the husband and 
wife divided the marital property  amicably. Mrs. Steen died in February
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o f 1980, a will having been executed several m onths before the McLellans 
separated, which left an estim ated $200,000 to the husband.
T h e  petition by the wife in Decem ber o f 1981 was, inter a lia , for a 
division (of the husband’s inherited assets) un d er the M .P .A .. Logan )., 
construing s.l o f  the Act, held that the Steen inheritance was neither a 
“family asset” nor “m arital p roperty”. He then proceeded to award the 
wife 25 per cent o f the husband’s inheritance un d er s.8 o f the Act, or 
alternatively, on the principle o f resulting trust. T h e  relevant parts are as 
follows:
8. In determ ining any application for a division of m arital property [em phasis 
added) the Court may m ake a division of am  property of either spouse  
that is not marital property where
(b) the result of the division of marital property would be inequitable  
in the circum stances having regard to
(i) the considerations set out in paragraphs 7(a) to (I)
7. N otw ithstanding sections 2. 3 and 4. the Court max make a division of 
marital propert\ resulting in shares that are not equal it the Court is of 
the opin ion that a division of the marital propert\ in equal shares would  
Ik * inequitable, having regard to
(0  anv other circum stances relating to the acquisition, disposition, pres­
ervation, m aintenance, im provem ent or lis t-  ol propt-rn rendering  
it inequitable for the d i\ ision ol marital propern  to be in equal shares.
Counsel for the wife asked that the principles of construc tive and resulting 
trust be considered on her behalf . T he  unjust enrichm ent of the husband 
and the original com m on intention that both spouses would share in anv 
gifts from  Mrs. Steen prom pted the trial judge to find that a resulting trust 
arose in favour of the wife. He then found it unnecessary to deal with the 
question o f construc tive trust.
An alternative application In counsel for the wife under s.42 of the 
M .P.A . was rejected by the trial judge. 1 he argum ent was based on the 
rationale of Leatherdale v. Leatherdale" where tfte Suprem e Court of Canada 
considered sections 4 and 8 of the O ntario  Earnil\ l.au ’ Reform Act (similar 
to ou r sections 3-8 and 42 respectively) in o rd er to make a division of non- 
family assets. This application was denied because of o u r exclusionary 
subsection 42(8).
An application shall not I k - m ade under subsection ( I )  with respect to ,ui\ 
property where .ui application oi .in ordei has Ih«ii made* le sp e iiin g  that 
property under Part I [which includes s.H|.
I he- equivalent to this subsec tion <>nl\ e x is ts  in the- ( )ntat i<> statute in regard 
to the si hem e em bodied in ( )ntario s. sec tion 4: and does not exist in regard 
to O ntario ’s, section S. f lius. the analogy to the Suprem e Court ruling
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which allowed a division o f  non-family assets where the marital property had 
already been settled, was held to be inappropriate.
U nhappy with the aw ard o f 25 per cent u n d er s.8 o f the M .P .A ., or 
un d er resulting trust, the husband launched an appeal (to have it reduced) 
and the wife launched a cross-appeal (to have it increased). Speaking for 
the New Brunswick C ourt o f Appeal, La Forest J.A . rightly pointed out that 
the trial judge erred  in applying s.8, as that section can only be invoked 
where there is an “application for a division o f martial p roperty”. Evidently, 
no such application was m ade at trial, as the m arital property  had already 
been settled in 1977. T he  Appeal Court held that the petition properly fell 
u nder s.42 (since the application under s.8 was invalid) as the wife was an 
“interested person” within the term s o f that section. In dismissing the 
appeal and the cross appeal, the C ourt held that it was unnecessary to 
justify the division on the basis o f  resulting o r constructive trust.
From a procedural point o f  view, two rem arks o f the Court o f  Appeal 
should be noted here. First, the Court felt that
In the present case, the application should have been m ade for a division  
(»1 marital property, follow ing which the court could in its discretion effect 
a division of non-m arital property."
The conclusion that one would logicallv draw from  this is that, regardless 
o f the disposition of the m arital property, where any property in a dispute 
is unsettled at the time o f the petition, the initial application should be 
m ade for a division o f marital proper!v which would allow s.8 to be- applied. 
Second, the C ourt noled that where no application has been made for a 
division of marital property ; s.42(8) does not operate as a bar to concurrent 
applications.
T he restitutionarv concepts did not ultimately serve as a basis for the 
division in this case, however, the im portance of pleading them  should not 
be overlooked. T h e  recent decision of the Suprem e Court of Canada in 
Palachik and Palachik v. Kiss'* is also authority for this. In that case, the wift* 
purchased the m atrim onial hom e (an apartm ent building in which they 
occupied the g round floor) with her own money , and m ade an agreem ent 
with the husband that he would pay her $100.00 per m onth until his half 
of the purchase price had been contributed. I he deed was then to be 
changed to one of joint ownership. T he  difficulty here, arose when she 
died three years before Mr. Kiss was to make his final payment; and her heirs 
were reluc tant to part with that share of her estate which yvas enriched In 
the- husbands monthly paym ents and carpentry skills in renovating the 
building. A lthough the* husband s application under the C)ntai io Family l.aic 
Ref (inn A ct1" had
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no application to the estate of a deceased spouse or form er spouse unless 
both are living at the tim e of the institution o f  the proceedings, the return  
o f  Frank’s |th e  husband’s] m onthly paym ents was supportable on the basis 
o f  constructive trust and the award in respect o f  his work and services on  
the basis of both constructive trust and the Succession Law Form Act."
W hereas Palachik and Palachik v. Kiss does not directly answer the 
question (of w hether o r not a marital property  regim e excludes the common 
law doctrines) which was left open by Laskin C.J. for the C ourt in Lealherdale 
v. Lealherdale; it does clearly indicate that in any situation which does not 
come within the purview o f a m arital property  act, the com m on law doc­
trines o f  resulting trust, constructive trust, contract, quasi-contract, unjust 
enrichm ent, and quantum  m eruit should all be canvassed.
W hen one considers the M cLellan, Lealherdale and Palachik decisions 
together; particularly in view of the New Brunswick C ourt o f A ppeal’s 
censure o f  the m ethod of pleading at trial in M cLellan;1- a m  application 
for division of property between spouses should include sections 3-8 and 
section 42 o f the M .P .A ., and all restitiutionarv concepts for which there  is 
a factual basis.
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